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Fifty years after Justice Jackson wrote of the "grotesque struc-
ture" of the character evidence rules,1 American courts, legislatures,
and scholars are still struggling with them. Their complexity is legen-
dary, their origins obscure, and their rationales controversial. Until
recently, legislatures had largely heeded Justice Jackson's warning
that "[t]o pull one misshapen stone" from the complex rules govern-
ing the use of defendant's character in criminal cases is more likely
simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to
establish a rational edifice."' That situation changed dramatically in
1994 when Congress enacted three new Federal Rules of Evidence
that blew away the character ban in a select class of cases and opened
for examination whether the rule should be abolished entirely. Be-
cause it is inevitable that many states will consider adopting the new
rules,5 a close look at the character ban is more urgently needed than
ever.
In commenting on the fine papers written by Professors Park and
Tillers, I will confine myself primarily to a few issues common to
both. I will also advance my own reasons for believing that reform of
the type exemplified by the new federal rules is ill-advised.
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Ange-
les. I defend the character rule at greater length in David P. Leonard, In Defense of the
Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial By Character, 73
IND. L.J. 1161 (1998).
1. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,486 (1948).
2. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion. .. ").
3. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 486.
4. FED. R. EVID. 413-15.
5. The states clearly take their cues from the Federal Rules of Evidence. Forty
states have adopted evidence codifications based on the Federal Rules. See 6
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997).
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1. The Definition of "Character"
Any effort to reform the character evidence rules must be rooted
in an acceptable definition of "character." Unfortunately, neither
psychologists nor legal commentators have yet provided one, and
Park and Tillers only further highlight the definitional controversy.
Park, for example, employs McCormick's definition of character as
"'a generalized description of one's disposition, or of one's disposi-
tion in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or
peacefulness."' 6 Based on this definition, one could assert that evi-
dence of a person's being a "drunkard" is character evidence.
Whether this is valid, however, depends on whether "character" has a
moral component7 and whether physical and mental conditions
wholly or partly beyond a person's control are properly classified as
character traits. If the condition of alcoholism does not reflect a per-
son's morality and is beyond her control, it is at least worth ques-
tioning whether classifying one as a "drunkard" speaks to her moral-
ity. My own sense is that people should be neither praised nor
blamed for characteristics over which they have no control.
Tillers rejects the traditional definition of character as "non-
sense," 8 and radically reformulates the concept as a sort of "internal
operating system" that influences a person's behavior.9 Applying a
6. Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 718 (1998)
(quoting 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 195, at 825 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
This definition, which conceives of character as a series of relatively stable "traits," has
long been the foundation for the character evidence rules, though psychological research
has cast doubt on its validity. For legal scholarship discussing relevant psychological data,
see Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Rele-
vancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504 (1991); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove
Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1986-
87); Miguel Angel Mendez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality,
45 EMORY L.J. 221 (1996); Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character
Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31
UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984).
7. Wigmore wrote that "[c]haracter... is to be considered... as the actual moral
or physical disposition or sum of traits ...... 1A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §52, at 1148 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983). Few people would dis-
agree, for example, that classifying a person as "honest" or "kind" speaks to her charac-
ter. What McCormick meant by "temperance" is unclear. If he meant simply a person's
"moderation in action, thought or feeling," (WEBSTER'S TENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1213 (1993)), perhaps the label is properly one of character.
8. Peter Tillers, What is Wrong with Character Evidence?. 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781,
818 (1998).
9. Tillers writes: "Human creatures have an internal system of rules, principles, or
operations that regulates or organizes their behavior." Id. at 825. Elsewhere, he writes:
"Our intuitions and common sense tell us that there is within each one of us some set of
principles and operations-some kind of a structure or 'logic'-that influences how we
behave." Id. at 828.
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theory of human autonomy, he sees character as at least partly a mat-
ter of choice or decision.! Thus, he would include such things as a
person's motivations within the definition of character." This, of
course, is contrary to conventional doctrine, which classifies "motive"
evidence as non-character.1
2
Clearly, we lack consensus about the proper definition of charac-
ter. Until agreement is reached, rational reform of the character evi-
dence rules cannot proceed.
H. The Adversary System and Problems of Prejudice
The problem of unfair prejudice has long been offered to sup-
port the character evidence ban. Both Park and Tillers highlight pre-
cisely what kinds of prejudice are involved and how they are thought
to operate. The authors are correct that the prejudice takes two
forms: inferential error prejudice and nullification prejudice. 3
Tillers4 and Park 5 also correctly assert that even with a ban on
"character evidence," the typical trial is rife with indications of char-
acter, and that the adversary system as practiced in the United States
tolerates-and even encourages-attorneys to expose the jury to evi-
dence of character through other means, thus inviting both types of
prejudice. Certainly, any reform of the character rules must take into
account the reality that attorneys often deliberately incite prejudice.
Nor should we doubt that in criminal trials, the prejudice is almost all
one way; though the prosecution often must rely on unsavory wit-
nesses, it is the defendant who usually bears the weight of unfavor-
able character assumptions, if only because she stands charged with
the crime. 6
10. "[I]t is logically permissible to suppose that 'character' is 'caused' by matters
such as 'choice' and 'decision,' and ... that being so, it is logically permissible to take
'character' as evidence of some 'choice' or 'decision."' Id. at 810. Elsewhere, Tillers
makes clear that behavior is not governed solely by conscious thoughts. Id. at 823.
11. See id. at 38-39.
12. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (defining "motive" as a proper non-character use
of other misconduct).
13. See Park, supra note 6, at 720, 725. Tillers uses the term "juror-inflation-of-
probative-value" to describe the first type of prejudice. Tillers, supra note 9, at 788. He
uses the terms "the sentiment that subverts and nullifies the authority of legal reason and
rules" to describe the second type. Id. at 786.
14. See Tillers, supra note 8, at 811-15. Tillers refers not only to formal evidence of-
fered ostensibly for non-character purposes but likely to be used for forbidden character
purposes, but also to arguments inviting character-based prejudice and other non-
evidentiary tactics. Id.
15. See Park, supra note 6, at 754-55 (referring to evasions of the supposed ban on
general propensity evidence and to the use of "unintelligible limiting instructions").
16. I recognize that as a practical matter, it is not possible to prevent all uses of char-
acter in a trial. Some of the more blatant adversarial misconduct can be controlled, how-
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I am also convinced that problems of prejudice are only margin-
ally less tangible in bench trials than in jury trials. There is no reason
to believe that judges evaluating character evidence are any less
likely to commit inferential error than are jurors. And while judges'
understanding of and commitment to legal rules protects many de-
fendants from nullification prejudice in bench trials, some such
prejudice certainly occurs. 7 I am reminded of the documentary The
Thin Blue Line,8 in which the judge who had presided over the trial
of a man for murdering a police officer showed emotion when dis-
cussing the case, even years later. 9 His desire to convict cop killers
undoubtedly bled into his evidentiary rulings, many of which went
against the defendant on crucial points. Character evidence rules
must apply as much to bench trials as to jury trials.
I1. Reform
Some uses of character "evidence" in daily life are unavoidable.
It is natural, for example, to consider what one has heard about an
individual before entrusting her with the care of one's children. Any
effort to control such behavior would fail in any event. But trials are
not natural events. They are highly stylized presentations conducted
pursuant to strict procedural rules and designed to answer specific
ever.
17. See Tillers, supra note 8, at 787-88.
18. (Miramax 1988). The defendant, Randall Adams. was convicted and sentenced
to death. Largely as a result of the documentary casting grave doubt on his guilt, he was
later freed. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Case Against the Death Penalty (last modified
Dec. 5, 1996) <http://ethics.acusd.edu/Bedeau.html>.
19. Judge Donald Metcalf, whose father was a Chicago police officer during the dif-
ficult years of prohibition, stated to the interviewer, "I grew up in a family where I was
taught a great respect for law enforcement and became acutely aware of the dangers that
... law enforcement officials go through that I think much of the public is not really sen-
sitive to." Id. Later, he said,
I always try very hard, every judge I know of does, to not show emotion on the
bench. The reason if you do show emotion, the jury might take it that you're fa-
voring one side or another. So you try to remain passive, emotionless, objective.
I do have to admit that in the Adams case, and I've never really said this, [the
prosecutor's] final argument was one I had never heard before about the thin
blue line of police that separated the public from anarchy, and I have to concede
that my eyes kind of welled up when I heard that. It did get to me emotionally
but I don't think I showed it.
You can understand why a man might steal if he needs money to put food on the
table. You ... I can understand why a 17-year-old boy who doesn't have a car
would steal one to ride around in. I can understand why a heroin addict needs
heroin. But I ... it's very hard to understand why anybody has to kill a police
officer. It just doesn't have to be.
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questions of fact fixed by discrete legal standards. Whether civil or
criminal, a great deal is at stake, perhaps even the life of a party. Tri-
als are also a representation of self-government in its most public
sense, brought down from the level of the general and abstract to that
of the individual. What happens in courts reflects both our commit-
ment to the rule of law and our most basic values about how disputes
should be resolved. Trials, therefore, must reflect our highest aspira-
tions about the search for truth and the protection of individual dig-
nity.
Dignitary rights are, of course, difficult to define, and it would be
foolish to claim social consensus for any particular view of behavior
that offends them. Nevertheless, I have been deeply persuaded of
the wisdom of a rule arising in Jewish Talmudic tradition. That rule
forbids loshon hora (literally, evil tongue).' According to the doc-
trine, except in the most narrow of circumstances, it is forbidden to
speak of others in a derogatory or harmful way.21 The purpose of the
rule is to protect personal dignity. Shmiras HaLoshon (guarding of
the tongue), on the other hand, expresses the quality of exercising
caution in speech.' The two concepts recognize the importance of
expression, and the view that words can both help and harm. The
very act of speech, in fact, is seen as the essential determinant of how
people relate to each other in societyn Though it is difficult to con-
20. This principle can be traced to Psalm 34, in which David states:
Who is the man that desireth life,
And loveth days, that he may see good therein?
Keep thy tongue from evil,
And thy lips from speaking guile.
Psalms 34:13-14.
21. See SHIMON FINKELMAN & YrrZCHAK BERKOWITZ, A LESSON A DAY: THE
CONCEPTS AND LAWS OF PROPER SPEECH ARRANGED FOR DAILY STUDY xvi (1995).
(,The book is based on the writings of Chofetz Chaim). There are exceptions to the prohi-
bition of loshon hora, the most common of which is when relating such information serves
a constructive purpose. Even then, there are strict limits. One may speak negatively
about a person only to help him or another that person has victimized, to resolve major
disputes, or to enable others to learn from the person's mistakes. Even then, several pre-
conditions must each be satisfied: The remarks must be based on first-hand information
and careful investigation; it must be clear that the person is wrong; the person has been
confronted but refuses to change his behavior; the statement will be accurate; the
speaker's intent is solely constructive, and there is a reasonable chance that the intended
goal will be achieved; there is no alternative means of achieving the goal; and the state-
ment will not cause undue harm. See id. at 148. The narrow exceptions to the prohibition
of loshon hora do not track perfectly those that apply in contemporary evidence law.
22. See id
23. "The Torah's laws of speech, whose observance is capsulized by the timeless
term Shimras HaLashon, constitutes God's plan for how people should live with each
other." Id. at xxi. "When one guards his speech and engages others in conversations that
are positive and constructive, the merit of Shmiras HaLashon is multiplied many times
Mar. 1998]
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trol one's hurtful thoughts, it is the expression of those thoughts that
does the real harm.4 Even accurate information can do unwarranted
harm. 5 By giving voice to our petty daily character judgments, we
encourage the kind of hatreds that divide us. Our judgmental words
deny the goodness and value of others.26
To speak ill of others not only hurts the subject, but also the
speaker. To demean others is to demean oneself; though there might
be momentary gratification in passing along derogatory information,
to do so leads ultimately to unhappiness and bitterness in the
speaker. 7 To hold one's tongue, or to speak well of others, expresses
the unity of people, engenders mutual respect, 9 and draws people
closer together."
The doctrines of loshon hora and Shmiras HaLashon support the
exclusion of character evidence, particularly in criminal cases. By
forbidding the use of bad character to prove guilt, the law prevents
the prosecution from calling witnesses to speak ill of others, even
when the information is accurate. On the other hand, it is permissi-
ble for the defendant to call witnesses to attest to qualities that would
make criminality less likely. Only then may the prosecution respond
with contrary evidence, to correct injustice that might result from the
jury's lack of balance in understanding the defendant's character.
The crime-by-crime approach to character evidence which Park
explores31 is fundamentally inconsistent with these concepts. Even
when allowed in prosecutions for crimes with particularly high rates
of recidivism (properly measured), character evidence causes unnec-
essary harm. 2  There are practical and political considerations as
because, by exercising restraint in speech, one draws others to their mitzvah as well." Id.
at xxxiv.
24. See id. at xxvii-xxviii.
25. One form of loshon hora, known as motzi shem ra, is simply slanderous. But
other forms need not be untrue. See id. at xxxix-xl.
26. See id. at xxxvi.
27. "In his eyes, he is surrounded by irritating, inconsiderate, flawed people who
make his world a disappointing, uncomfortable place." Id. at xxxvii. More deeply, it is
thought that the speaker's "words, and the sense of power they confer upon him, foil the
soul's constant striving toward its Source. By pushing others down, loshon hora provides
one with the illusion of becoming more elevated." Id. at xxxvii-xxxviii.
28. See id. at xxxii.
29. See id. at xxxv.
30. See id. at xxxix. It has even been said that Shmiras HaLoshon is the key for at-
taining God's mercy. See id. at xlv.
31. Park, supra note 6, at 756-74.
32. Forbidding the character-based use of other misconduct evidence does not mean
the evidence is entirely excluded. Where evidence of a person's other wrongdoing is truly
needed in order to prove a relevant fact, it can frequently be admitted on a non-character
theory. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (allowing evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" to
prove such facts as "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
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well; it is difficult to defend the admissibility of character in sexual
assault cases,33 but not in murder cases. Perhaps more importantly, if
evidence rules are made to conform to the pressures of the political
forum, principle is certain to yield to the pursuit of votes? This is not
a prudent way to reform evidence rules that have long been struc-
tured to apply equally in virtually all types of cases. 5
Conclusion
Trials should seek both determination of truth and protection of
individual dignity. Though serving these values sometimes leads to
conflicting evidentiary rules, the character ban represents a reason-
able accommodation. By forbidding the reporting of vague rumor or
personal opinion of character, and by protecting a defendant from
having to explain all the deeds of her past, the law eliminates one
type of dangerously prejudicial evidence and affirms the dignity of all
defendants, even those accused of heinous crimes. Though character
evidence-particularly in large, detailed amounts--can have substan-
tial probative value,3 we affirm our better instincts and our highest
aspirations when we resist the temptation to permit trial by character.
Any effort to reform the character rules must take account of this
fundamental truth.
or absence of mistake or accident").
33. See FED. R. EVID. 413.
34. This was certainly the case in the enactment of Rules 413-15, which became a
part of the 1994 crime legislation primarily to obtain the favorable votes of two key mem-
bers of Congress. See Anne Elsberry Kyl, The Propriety of Propensity: The Effects and
Operations of New Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 659, 659-60
(1995) (noting "extensive negotiations between Reps. Molinari and Kyl and the House
Democratic leadership" over the inclusion of the rules); Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Proj-
ect: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence With Supporting Commentary,
171 F.R.D. 330, 476 (1997) ("Rules 413-15 are a part of the 1994 Crime Bill because the
Clinton administration needed a few more votes in the House of Representatives.").
35. See David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 341 (1995) (discussing the unitary nature of evidence law).
36. Both Park and Tillers argue persuasively that character evidence can have sub-
stantial probative value. Park, supra note 6, at 721-27; Tillers, supra note 8, at 783.
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